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I. INTRODUCTION 
Problems of pluri-dimensional complexity of definition, classi-
fication and norm-formulation converge in any meaningful en-
deavor to explore practical measures to prevent, preempt or other-
wise to discourage and suppress acts of terrorism on an 
international scene. The present study is devoted to the treatment 
of only one of these problems, namely, the problem of jurisdiction. 
This problem presents itself in more than one connection. To en-
sure proper appreciation of the nature and scope of the multi-fac-
eted problem of jurisdiction in the context of international terror-
ism, preliminary attention is focused on the need to adopt a 
balanced approach to the basic notion of international terrorism. 
In the pages that follow, the study will consist of five substan-
tive parts. In addition to Part I, Part II will deal with the problem 
of defining "international terrorism," examining the definition pre-
viously adopted in the Geneva Convention of 1937 and its current 
adaptations analyzing various elements of acts of terrorism, and 
illustrating the different types of offenses associated with "interna-
tional terrorism." 
Part III will examine the conceptual problem relating to the 
different types as well as the nature and scope of national jurisdic-
tion of a sovereign State, the exercise of such jurisdiction, the 
causes of jurisdictional problems and some plausible solutions. 
Part IV will consider the permissible legal bases of jurisdic-
tion, through the Territorial Principle, subjective and objective, in-
cluding its extended notion and intended effect, the Nationality or 
Personality Principle, active and passive, the Protective Principle 
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and its role as an alternative to the passive nationality principle, 
the Universal Principle in its glowing splendor and the Principle of 
Consent expressed in the form of an international agreement. 
These principles are presented with all necessary ramifications. 
Part V will suggest a possible posture in response to interna-
tional terrorism, partly through ratification of the anti-terrorism 
related conventions, partly by introduction of improved procedures 
for extradition of alleged off enders of terrorist acts, and without 
impairing the right to seek political asylum, especially excluding 
"terrorism" from the exception of political offense in extradition 
treaties and statutes, taking into account the available option to 
surrender or to prosecute the alleged offender. 
Part VI will leave readers with an irresistible conclusion in 
support of an international obligation for all States to cooperate 
and to adopt all measures necessary to contain and combat acts of 
international terrorism, to preempt or prevent terrorist acts, and to 
punish the off enders for their international crimes regardless of 
race, sex or religion, and indeed their official status or governmen-
tal connections notwithstanding. 
II. DEFINING "TERRORISM" 
A. AN ACCEPTED DEFINITION OF "INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM" 
Definitional problems of primary importance loom large in any 
attempt to encapsulate the general notion of "terrorism" or to 
identify the salient features of "acts of terrorism." A marked in-
crease in the intensity, frequency and variety of occurrences of 
"acts of terrorism" in the diverse parts of the globe has prompted 
more recent authors to suggest a definitional approach1 with vary-
ing components1 without sufficiently reflecting the existing notion 
of terrorism as earlier defined in a general multilateral convention. 
For a purpose, not unlike that of the present study, the Con-
1. See, e.g., Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and 
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law under the FSIA and the Act of 
State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191-251 (1983). 
2. Paust, supra note l, at 192-93. "Terrorism itself can be defined as a process that 
involves the international use of violence, or threat of violence, against an instrumental tar-
get in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of future violence so as both to 
coerce the primary target into behavior or attitudes through intense fear or anxiety and to 
serve a particular political end.'; Id. Compare Mickolus, Statistical Approaches to the 
Study of Terrorism, in TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 209-10 (Y. Alexander & 
S. Finger eds. 1977); Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occa-
sioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217, 219 n.1 (1977). 
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vention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, adopted 
by the Internatational Conference On the Repression of Terrorism 
on November 16, 1937 (1937 Convention),8 contains a pertinent 
definition of "acts of terrorism" as well as provisions elaborating 
and enumerating criminal offenses under this heading. 
Article 1, paragraph 2, of the 1937 Convention provides: 
In the present convention, the expression "acts of terrorism" 
means criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calcu-
lated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, 
or group of persons or the general public.• 
Before proceeding to define the notion of terrorism, Paragraph 
1 of the 1937 Convention reaffirms "the principle of international 
law in virtue of which it is the duty of every State to refrain from 
any act designed to encourage terrorist activities directed against 
another State and to prevent the acts in which such activities take 
shape."& It also stipulates the obligation of States to "undertake as 
hereinafter provided to prevent and punish activities of this nature 
and to collaborate for this purpose. "6 This undertaking implies the 
duty on the part of each of the States that are parties to adopt 
legislation establishing jurisdiction not only to arrest; try and pun-
ish, but above all to prescribe as a punishable offense acts of ter-
rorism so defined' and to extend criminal jurisdiction of its courts 
to prosecute and enforce judgements. 
Article 2 requires each of the States' parties to make the fol-
lowing acts of terrorism punishable criminal offenses if committed 
on its territory and directed against another State party: 
3. An alarming number of political assassinations have taken place in Europe in rapid 
succession since 1934. Notable among the internationally protected persons who fell victim 
to terrorist acts may b~ mentioned: Monsieur Louis Barthou, the French Minister of For-
eign Affairs, and King Alexander of Yugoslavia, who was assailed in Marseilles while visiting 
France. 
The two notorious incidents prompted France and its European allies to convene an 
international conference in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations, which 
adopted the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, on Nov. 16, 1937. 
See Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Compendium of 
Relevent International Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 18-22 (Apr. 13, 1983) [here-
inafter Draft Code]; see also International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, 
Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 16, 1937, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/368, at 23-26 (1983) [hereinafter Geneva Convention of 1937]. Neither of the two 
Conventions entered into force as World . War II interrupted the process of ratification by 
States. 
4. Draft Code, supra note 3, at 18. 
5. Id. art. 1, para. 1, at 18. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. arts. 2-4, at 18-19. 
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(1) Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of 
liberty to: 
(a) Heads of States, persons exercising the perogatives of the 
head of the State, their hereditary or designated successors; 
(b) The wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons; 
(c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public 
positions when the act is directed against them in their public 
capacity. 
(2) Wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or property 
devoted to a public purpose belonging to or subject to the author-
ity of another High Contracting Party. 
(3) Any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of 
the public. 
( 4) Any attempt to commit an offence falling within the foregoing 
provisions of the present article. 
(5) The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of arms, 
ammunition, . explosives, or harmful substances , with a view to the 
commission in any country whatsoever of an offence falling within 
the present article. 8 
The definition adopted by the 1937 Convention and the list of 
punishable offenses of acts of terrorism were incorporated in the 
third report of Minister Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, for 
the International Law Commission in Draft Code of Offences 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in 1985.9 Draft Article 
11 of the fourth report by the same author, enumerates acts consti-
tuting crimes against peace, among which paragraph 4 includes: 
the undertaking, assisting or encouragement by the authorities of a 
State of terrorist acts in another State, or the toleration by these 
authorities of activities organized for the purpose of carrying out 
terrorist acts in another State.10 Subparagraph (a) contains a defi-
nition of terrorist acts11 taken almost verbatim from the 1937 Con-
vention12 and sub-paragraph (b) in effect enumerates offenses con-
stituting terrorist acts in the same fashion as Article 2 of the 
8. Iq. at 18. 
9. See Thiam, Third Report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Se-
curity of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/387, art. 4, para. (D), reprinted in [1985) 2 Y.B. INT'L 
L. CoMM'N 82-83, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1985/Add.(Part 1). 
10. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 38th Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/41/10, reprinted in [1986) Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N ch. 5, art. 11, para. 4, at 43 
n.105 [hereinafter International Law Commission Report]. 
11. Id. Compare Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 
16, 1937, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 23-26 (1983). 
12. See id. 
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earlier Convention.13 
B. ELEMENTS OF "ACTS OF TERRORISM" 
The elements of "acts of terrorism" as contained in the 1937 
Convention and the Draft Articles by Minister Doudou Thiam are 
broadly similar. The acts in question, the actus reus, must be pun-
ishable offenses, directed against a State, and intended or calcu-
lated, mens rea, to create a state of fear or "terror" in the minds of 
public figures, or a group of persons or the general public. First, to 
constitute a crime against peace, as a category of offenses against 
the peace and security of mankind, the "terrorist acts" or "acts of 
terrorism" must be by the authorities of a State consisting either 
in the "undertaking," "assisting" or "encouragement" and it has to 
be committed in another State. 
Alternatively, the definition also covers "toleration" by State 
authorities "of activities organized for the purpose of carrying out 
terrorist acts in another State. m• To amount to a crime against 
peace, the terrorist acts must have been attributable to a State ei-
ther through State authorities, in the form of active undertaking, 
assistance or encouragement, or indeed passive toleration without 
actual participation. In any event, the definition presupposes the 
existence of an obligation on the part of a State not knowingly to 
allow its territory to be used in the organizing or staging of activi-
ties for the commission of terrorist acts in another State. 
Secondly, the act must be directed against "another State." 
To this requirement is added "or the population of a State," 
thereby extending the scope of terrorism to cover also the popula-
tion of another State.16 Finally, the element of intent or purpose or 
mens rea is clearly referable to the intentional inducement of 
"fear" or "terror," a psychological effect to be produced by the ac-
tus reus or the act of terror in question. 
Thus, an act of terrorism which is directed against a State or 
its population and calculated to create a state of fear in the minds 
of individuals, a group of persons or the public at large _does not 
constitute an offense against peace (or against the peace and secur-
13. International Law Commission Report, supra note 10, at 43 n.105. Compare Ge-
neva Convention of 1937, supra note 3, at 4. 
14. See International Law Commission Report, supra note 10, para.4, at 43 n.105. 
15. Id. Note especially "Definition of Terrorist Acts." In fact, this extension is implicit 
in the creation of a state of "terror" or "fear" in the minds of public figures ( chez des 
personalites), or a group of persons or the general public. The last "phrase" is invariably 
referable to the population of that other State. 
5
Sucharitkul: International Terrorism and the Problem of Jurisdiction
Published by SURFACE, 1987
146 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:141 
ity of mankind) under the Draft Code, unless the act in question 
was committed by another State or was otherwise imputed or at-
tributable to the State through its officials' action or omission or 
toleration. 
Even without this additional element linking the act of terror-
ism to the State through the "undertaking," "assisting," "encour-
agement" or "toleration" by State authorities, an act of terrorism 
by whomsoever performed remains a criminal act nonetheless. The 
imputation of the act to a State serves to aggravate the nature and 
seriousness of the offense so as to elevate it from an ordinary inter-
national crime required by treaty to be made punishable under do-
mestic law, to the top category of the gravest crimes, an "offence 
against the peace and security of mankind," with all the grave con-
sequences that inevitably follow. 
The 1937 Convention obliged State parties not only to refrain 
from any acts designed to encourage terrorist activities but also to 
prevent the acts in which terrorist activities take shape.16 Thus, 
States undertook thereby to prevent and punish activities of this 
nature. A breach of such an undertaking does not entail responsi-
bility of a State for the commission of the act or organization of 
activities by individuals who are neither authorities nor officials of 
the State. Nevertheless, knowledge and toleration of such activities 
may amount to a breach of duty engaging State responsibility for 
failure to prevent the occurrence of such unlawful activities on its 
territory. A closer examination of concrete examples in State prac-
tice may help clarify some of the inherent obscurities and ambigui-
ties. Given the existence of an act of terrorism, our concern may 
still be precluded by the noninternational or nontransnational 
character of the act. 
C. "ACTS OF TERRORISM" AND "INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM" 
An act of terrorism may constitute but an ordinary crime or 
criminal offense if committed wholly within the boundary of one 
State and not directed against any other State.17 In a sense, every 
16. See Draft Code, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 1, at 18. Examples are numerous. Libya 
has been known to encourage terrorist activities directed against Egypt, Chad and the 
United States. On the other hand, the United States together with the People's Republic of 
China, Iran and Pakistan have been accused by a socialist country of training and assisting 
Afghan terrorists whom we believe to be freedom-fighters in their struggles to liberate Af-
ghanistan from Soviet domination. See Secretary General's Report on Terrorism, U.N. Doc. 
(1985). 
17. For instance, the Tylenol terror was confined to the United States and not in-
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crime is an offense directed against the society or the State. In-
deed, some offenses are specifically labeled offenses against the 
State, whether in form of offenses against national security, such 
as sedition or high treason, or offenses against economic or finan-
cial stability. According to the definition given above, an "act of 
terrorism" is at least a crime calculated to create a state of fear in 
the mind of individuals, groups or the general public. It is also di-
rected against another state. 18 
An "act of terrorism," however, is elevated to the status of 
"international terrorism" solely on account of its "international-
ity." It therefore presupposes the involvement of at least two 
States, the State responsible for the terrorist act directly or by im-
putation and the victim State against which the terrorist act is 
directed. 
History has known notorious instances of terrorism, although 
not always categorized as such an offense. Thus, we have heard of 
Ivan the Terrible as distinguished from Richard the Lion Heart. 
In post-revolutionary France the expression "la regne de terreur" 
has been used to describe the terrifying occurrences. 19 During 
World War II, a resolution was adopted by the Allied governments 
condemning German Terror and demanding retribution. 20 Subse-
tended to cause injury outside this country, unless the product was exported abroad. The 
element of intent has also to be taken into account. 
18. Thus, the killing of an American national in the Achille Lauro incident is said to be 
directed, inter alia, against the United States. The definitions here examined represent in-
ternational efforts under the League of Nations and present-day United Nations. They are 
essentially more objective than national efforts, such as those attributable to the United 
States or the United Kingdom, which tend to protect their own nationals in contemporary 
environment as prospective victims of terrorist attacks by Iranian or Libyan or the Irish 
Republican Army. Thus, Americans and English are by definition not terrorists but victims 
of terrorism under their respective statutes. 
19. Terrorism, both as a concept and a term of art, dates back to the era of the French 
Revolution and the Jacobin Reign of Terror (1793-1794). See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
216 (1911). This practice of terror provided the contemporary prototype of what has come 
to be known as State terrorism or government terrorism, whereby an existing regime inflicts 
severe penalties and acts of arbitrary violence on defenseless population. The most glaring 
example of our time is the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
20. In London, on January 13, 1942, representatives of the governments of the occu-
pied countries of Europe then established in London, and of the Free French National Com-
mittee, met at St. James's Palace and signed a formal resolution condemning the German 
regime of terror throughout occupied Europe, recalling "that international law, and in par-
ticular the Convention signed at The Hague in 1907 regarding the laws and customs of land 
warfare, do not permit belligerents in occupied countries to commit acts of violence against 
civilians, to disregard the law in force, or to overthrow national institutions." See U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/368, at 28 (1983). Reference was also made to declarations on October 25, 1941 by 
the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister. 
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quently, a declaration was made in Moscow on German atrocities.21 
Aside from wartime terrors or terrorist acts committed during 
an armed conflict, "acts of terrorism" continued long after the ces-
sation of hostilities. Happenings in various parts of the world did 
not conform to the same or similar pattern of terror connected 
with post-war guerilla activities as in Greece. 22 The first notable 
terrorist group known in Asia with transboundary activity were the 
C.T. (Chinese, or at times Communist, Terrorists)23 in Malaya 
before and also after independence in 1957. Their purpose was to 
change the regime in the country by means of terrorism. 2• If their 
activities were confined to ·the borders of Malaya without instiga-
tion or assistance or encouragement from outside, they would 
amount to nothing more than ordinary bandits or highway men, 
operating against local law, not unlike Robin Hood of Sherwood 
Forest, except that there was no oppression against the poor on the 
part of the ruling authority. In fact, it was an attempt to bring 
about changes by force of terror, directed from outside against the 
internal security and stability of Malaya. 
The C.T. might have been the first such classic example of in-
ternational terrorism. On the other hand, there had been other in-
stances of native uprising with the aim to overthrow existing colo-
nial government or removing alien domination. These colonial 
peoples were not only denied their basic right of self-determination 
as peoples but were also labeled "terrorist," such as the "Mau 
21. The Moscow Declaration on German Atrocities of October 30, 1943 was signed by 
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Chairman Joseph Stalin, referring to the 
atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded executions being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces, 
and to the brutalities of Hitlerite domination as "the worst form of government by terror." 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 29 (emphasis added). 
22. After the close of hostilities in World War II, Communist guerillas were infiltrated 
into Greece across the border from Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Proposals by the 
Commission of Investigation to set up a permanent frontier commission were rejected by 
Soviet double veto in the Security Council. See 2 U.N. SCOR Special Supp. (No. 2) at 156-
57; 2 U.N. SCOR (Nos. 51-64) at 1126-1547; see also G.A. Res. 109(11) (Oct. 2, 1947), setting 
up a special committee to observe compliance by the four governments concerned with rec-
ommendations of the General Assembly. 
23. These were Communist-inspired bandits of Chinese origin taking hostages and .de-
manding extortions from among the Chinese population in Malaya in order to embarrass the 
British Colonial Government and subsequently its Malayan successor, the Federation of 
Malay States. 
24. Chinese inspired Communist Parties were formed in almost every country in 
South-East Asia, notably Burma, Laos, Thailand, Malay, Indonesia, Singapore and the Phil-
ippines. Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk were both supported by Peking from the start. The fate 
and growth of the Chinese oriented communist parties in South-East Asian countries have 
been discussed in other works. See, e.g., Rahman, The Communist Threat in Malaysia and 
Southeast Asia, PACIFIC COMMUNITY 8 (July 1977); FOREIGN AFFAIRS MALAYSIA No. 3, at 1. 
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Maus" in Africa or even the Algerians and the Indo-Chinese before 
their respective independence, struggling to liberate their nationals 
from the yoke of colonial oppression. 25 The process of decoloniza-
tion could indeed be painful; the deliverance of an independent 
nation has often entailed far greater labor pain for the reluctant 
colonial power than the delivery of an overgrown child by an unco-
operative mother. National liberation movements could avail 
themselves of external assistance with world-wide endorsement.26 
One crucial point has been rendered crystal clear beyond any 
shadow of suspicion. General Assembly Resolution 3103(XXVIII), 
which enumerates the basic principles of the legal status of the 
combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and 
racist regimes, has succeeded in precluding national liberation 
movements from the presumption of guilt. There is less possibility 
of converting "freedom-fighters" into "terrorists," and "merce-
naries" into "national heroes." The four categories are so far apart 
that no confusion would seem likely today, although the recent 
past was still contaminated with such distortions. Freedom-fighters 
are now accepted as national heroes, while mercenaries have been 
outlawed in Africa, and condemned as criminals. Mercenarism is a 
crime, when used to oppose national liberation movements. 27 
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Resolution 3103(XXVIII) run: 
5. The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the 
25. See, e.g.,lmplementation of Declaration 1514 on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2465(XXIll) para. 8 (Dec. 20, 1968). This resolu-
tion declared the practice of using mercenaries against movements of national liberation and 
independence to be a punishable criminal act. See also G.A. Res. 2548(XXIV) (1969), de-
claring that the continuation of colonial rule threatens international peace and security and 
that the practice of apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination constitute a crime 
against humanity, and reiterating the criminality of the use of mercenaries against move-
ments for national liberation and independence. Of late, mercenaries were also used by for-
eign powers to invade the independent Republic of Seychelles in an attempt to overthrow 
its legitimate government. Compare G.A. Res. 2708(XXV) (1970), and O.A.U. Convention 
for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Libreville, June 30, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ 
368, at 64-66 [hereinafter O.A.U. Convention]. 
26. See G.A. Res. 1514(XV) (1960), on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples, and subsequent resolutions on the implementation and accelaration of the 
decolonization process. G.A. Res. 2465(XXIll) (Dec. 20, 1968); G.A. Res. 2548(XXIV) (Dec. 
11, 1969); G.A. Res. 2708(XXV) (Dec. 14, 1970). 
27. The first Algerian delegation to the United Nations was headed by Mohamed Ben 
Balla, leader of the FLN, at one time the most dreaded "terrorist" by French standard. A 
similar path was followed by many a statesman in Africa and the so-called Middle East, by 
the Zulus and the Mau Maus, and by the Jews in Palestine, each of whom has had to strug-
gle hard to earn national liberation and independence. Once treated as "terrorists" by for-
mer colonial masters, they are today respected and proclaimed world-wide as national 
heroes. 
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national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and in-
dependence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is 
considered to be a criminal act and the mercenaries should accord-
ingly be punished as criminals. 
6. The violation of the legal status of the combatants struggling 
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes in the 
course of armed conflicts entails full responsibility in accordance 
with the norm of international law.28 
Between mercenaries and national liberations movements, the 
position has been made unquestionably clear. Mercenaries or hired 
killers fight for reward, not to achieve independence or national 
liberation, but rather to prolong colonial and alien domination or 
racist regimes. 29 On the other hand, this clarity will in no way jus-
tify "acts of terrorism" or "international terrorism" by whomso-
ever committed. 
Regulation of the use of force in an armed conflict in the 
course of liberation, as in other instances of armed conflict, does 
not necessarily guarantee absence of violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war by either side of the combatants. Suffice it to confirm 
that such violations entail State responsibility under international 
law.80 Not only the State that violated the regulation would be re-
sponsible, but the insurgents or rebels considered to be protected 
by the Geneva Conventions of 194981 and additional Protocols of 
28. G.A. Res. 3103(XXVIII), Dec. 12, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 90. On the other 
hand, combatants are also required to observe the laws and customs of armed conflict with-
out exception. 
29. See, e.g., O.A.U. Convention, supra note 25, at 64-69. Compare Additional Proto-
cols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 95; 1977 U.N. Juam. Y.B. ch. IV. 
30. Every State is held responsible for its internationally wrongful act. See Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility, Part I, (1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N pt. 2, at 26-63 (provision-
ally adopted by the International Law Commission at first reading). Take special notice of 
Chapter I: General Principles, Articles 1-4, and Chapter II: The "Act of the State" under 
International Law, Articles 5-15. 
31. The Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of War Victims. Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.l.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.l.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, T.l.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.l.A.S. No. 3365, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287. See, e.g., Article 3 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, which imposes on each Party to the armed conflict, as a 
minimum, the obligation to treat humanely all persons who are "hors de combat" (out of 
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197782 could be equally liable. Violations in the form of taking of 
hostages, torture, killing of hostages, or reprisals could be punisha-
ble as offenses against the laws and customs of war, and could take 
the form of "acts of terrorism." 
There are also other "acts of terrorism" which are not exclu-
sively taking place within one and the same State, but may have 
transboundary connections or networks that are regional or global. 
Just as the pirates jure gentium operate on the high seas, outside 
national jurisdiction of any State, an organized band of terrorists 
may have their planning and operational sites in more than one 
country. The Red Army or other extremist groups of Japan,88 the 
Baader-Meinhof gang84 in the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Mafia or the Brigatto Rosso of Italy (Red Brigade) need not stay 
put at one headquarters within one country, they often cross na-
tional borders. 
A gang of terrorists like the Mafia or the Red Brigade, which 
could operate for private ends or for loftier motives, could commit 
within Italy an act of terrorism such as the assassination of the 
Anti-terrorist Commander in Sicily, 86 or the kidnapping and subse-
combat) by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
32. Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Hu-
manitarian Law Applicable in Armed Confiict: Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conven-
tions, Aug. 12, 1949, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (adopted June 8, 
1977). Protocol I, Part III, Section I (Methods and Means of Warfare), Article 35 (Basic 
rules), provides in paragraph 2, "[i]t is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and mate-
rial and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffer-
ing," and in paragraph 3, "[i]t is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which 
are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment." See also id. arts. 36-37. 
33. A suicide crash by a monoplane into a private home and other explosions were at-
tempted at various industrial complexes, such as the Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, sometimes 
by the leftist group in protest against capitalism, other times by the rightist group urging 
for more militant actions on the part of the government and other enterprises. 
34. See, e.g., the Klaus Croissant Extradition Case, 106 JOURNAL ou DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 91 (1979). The Conseil d'Etat, Section du Contentieux, Fr., upheld the decision of 
the French Government to extradite Klaus Croissant, a German national closely associated 
with the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang, in response to the request made by the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the ground that the charge of furnishing aid 
to persons who committed crimes was not political in its purpose, although the purpose was 
described in the international arrest warrant as "to topple the established order of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany." Id. at 96. See Le Figaro, Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, col. 3; Le Monde, 
Oct. 2-3, 1977, at 7, col. 1; Le Monde, Oct. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 5; Le Monde, Nov. 26, 1977, at 
1, col. 3; see also Carbonnau, Terrorist Acts, Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appraisal 
of Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265-97. 
35. The Italian General was waylaid and assassinated in his own car on his way home 
in the fall of 1982. The case was reported in Italian newspapers and the European edition of 
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quent assassination of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro of Italy, 86 
could be considered as being directed against the territorial gov-
ernment or the home State. On the other hand, the taking hostage 
of General Dozier,37 N~TO Commander of Logistics in Northern 
Italy, although motivated by private gains, was nevertheless di-
rected against another State (i.e., the United States, of which Gen-
eral Dozier was a national) as well as against an international or-
ganization (NATO). Regardless of the political motivations in all 
three cases mentioned above, the offenses committed in Italy could 
clearly be regarded as acts of terrorism. Of the three instances, 
however, the Dozier case was apparently the only example of "in-
ternational terrorism," since the hostage was a foreign (non-Ital-
ian) national and the act was directed against another State. 
These three instances may be distinguished from yet another 
category of terrorist acts, such as, the kidnap of the heir of Bul-
gari38 for a ransom, which took place in Italy as well as outside 
Italy, for the place of payment of the extortion money was made in 
Switzerland despite official efforts to intercept any transfer of 
money from Italy. Since there are multiple venues of the crime, the 
locus delicti commissi was duplicated in more than one State. This 
could be viewed in a sense as an international crime or rather an 
act of transboundary terrorism. But it was for purely private ends, 
and as such would not be of direct concern to the present inquiry, 
which, by definition, excludes acts of transboundary terrorism not 
directed against any other State, but against an individual or fam-
ily to extort money or undue advantages. 
Further instances could be cited which illustrate the interna-
tional character of the acts of terrorism. The explosion which 
killed the President of the Republic of Korea and injured many 
members of his party while on a state visit in Rangoon, Burma in 
198239 was clearly directed against the Republic of Korea, as well 
as incidentally against the Union of Burma, as the host State re-
sponsible for the safety and security of the visiting head of State 
and dignitaries. The fact that the terrorists were agents of the 
the Herald Tribune. 
36. See, e.g., Red Brigade Hunt Intensifies in France, Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 4, 
1979, at 5, col. 1 (the Piperno extradition case in connection with the assassination of Aldo 
Moro). 
37. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1982, at 3, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1981, at A3, col. 1. 
38. The incident was reported in local press as well as in the European edition of the 
Herald Tribune in 1984. 
39. See debate in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 1982. 
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Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not make the act any 
less international. Similarly, the shooting of a Korean jet liner over 
the Pacific by Soviet shore missiles on August 31, 1983 was not a 
purely domestic incident, as the act entailed far-reaching repercus-
sions in the history of civil aviation.''0 Nor was the destruction of 
the Rainbow Warrior, a vessel of Greenpeace, in a harbor irt New 
Zealand, by French agents ever to be deemed within France's do-
mestic jurisdiction. 41 
The international character of the act of terrorism attributable 
to a State in all these cases fit the definition of "international ter-
rorism." Moreover, they constitute instances of State terrorism, 
par excellence. The mining of a harbor in time of peace for 
whatever reason has been found by the International Court of Jus-
tice to constitute breaches of international obligations entailing in-
ternational responsibility of the Respondent, the United States of 
America. "42 
40. See, e.g., the decision of the Pilot Association boycotting landing in Moscow, and 
other counter-measures adopted by the Council of Europe. Efforts were made to prevent the 
recurrence of such incidents by establishing points for monitoring routing services in Japan, 
U.S.S.R., and the United States to coordinate the locality of each civil aircraft. See Memo-
randum of Understanding Concerning Air Traffic Control, July 29, 1985, United States-Ja-
pan-U.S.S.R., 25 l.L.M. 74 (entered into force Oct. 8, 1985). For the agreement among Air 
Traffic Control Centers implementing the memorandum, see 25 l.L.M. 77 (1986); see also 
Documents Concerning Korean Air Lines Incident, 22 l.L.M. 1109 (1983); INT'L C1v1L AVIA-
TION 0RG., REP. REGARDING KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT, 23 l.L.M. 864 (1984); Amendment to 
the Convention on International Civil Aviation with Regard to Interception of Civil Aircraft, 
May 10, 1984, 23 l.L.M. 705. 
41. On July 10, 1985, members of the French Directorate General of External Security 
(DGSE) placed detonating devices aboard the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior, docked 
in Aukland harbor, New Zealand. The vessel was planning to sail to French Polenesia to 
protest against nuclear testing about to be carried out there. The explosion resulted in the 
death of one Dutch crew member and total destruction of the vessel. Two French agents 
were arrested, tried, and sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment by the New Zealand 
Chief Justice, for manslaughter and wilful damage to the ship. The dispute between New 
Zealand and France was settled on ihe basis of a Ruling Pertaining to the Difference be-
tween France and New Zealand Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, Report of the 
Secretary-General to the U.N. General Assembly, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 6, U.N. 
Doc. A/41/1 (1986). The final settlement of the amount of reparation and compensation is 
still under arbitration. See also Commonwealth Bulletin, Apr. 1986, at 380; D. Roe1E, EYES 
OF FIRE: THE LAST VOYAGE OF THE Rainbow Warrior (1987); Sawyer, Rainbow Warrior: Nu-
clear War in the Pacific, 8(4) THIRD WORLD Q. 1325 (Oct. 1986). 
42. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
l.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 26, 1986). The Court found in favor of the Applicant, Nicara-
gua, on at least 14 different counts. In particular, Count (6) by twelve votes to three, the 
court decided that, by laying mines in the internal and territorial waters of the Republic of 
Nicaragua during the months of 1984, the United States has acted against the Republic of 
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force 
against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to 
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D. TYPES OF OFFENSES ASSOCIATED WITH "INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM'' 
Having to some extent drawn a boundary line between "inter-
national or transboundary terrorism" of relevant interest to our in-
quiry and those that need not detain further attention, we may 
next examine briefly the types of offenses which may constitute 
acts of international terrorism meriting the most attentive consid-
eration. Broadly speaking, within the scope of the internationally 
accepted definition, acts constituting international terrorism, for 
present purposes, may be classified under the following categories 
of offenses: 
1. Offenses against internationally protected persons,"3 
such as the kidnapping or assassination of a head of 
state. 
2. Taking of hostages"" or seizing a public building, 
such as an embassy or a consulate. 
3. Wilful destruction of, or damage to public property 
devoted to public purpose,"& such as explosion of 
bombs in a courthouse or a department store. 
4. Wilful acts calculated to endanger the lives of mem-
bers of the public,"6 such as throwing grenades or firing 
machine guns in a crowded airport. 
5. Hijacking of aircraft, vessels and other public 
means of transport. 47 
6. The manufacture, obtaining, possession or supplying 
of arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substances 
interrupt peaceful maritime commerce. See id. para. 292, at 137-42. 
43. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internation-
ally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.l.A.S. 
No. 8532, 13 l.L.M. 41 [hereinafter Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes]; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, T.S. No. 90, 
15 l.L.M. 1272 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
44. See International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. 
Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23, reprinted in 18 l.L.M. 1456 
(1979); European Convention, supra note 43, art. l(D). 
45. See European Convention, supra note 43, art. l(E); Draft Code, supra note 3, Art. 
2, Doc. A/CN.4/368, para. 2 at 18. 
46. See Geneva Convention of 1937, supra note 3, Art. 2, para. 3. 
47. See Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.l.A.S. No. 7192, 10 l.L.M. 133 [hereinafter Hague (Hijacking) Con-
vention of 1970]. 
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with a view to the commission of any of the above 
offenses. 48 
155 
To this list should also be added acts which constitute the 
commission of any of the above offenses, such as: 
(1) conspiracy to commit any such act enumerated in numbers 
one to five above;"' 
(2) any incitement to any such act, if successful;50 
(3) direct public incitement to any such act whether or not 
successful;u 
( 4) wilful participation in any such act; 52 
(5) assistance, knowingly given, towards the commission of 
any such act;58 
( 6) any attempt to commit any such act. 54 
III. THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION 
A. THE PROBLEM STATED 
1. The Conceptual Problem 
The problem connected with jurisdiction is manifold. To begin 
with, there seems to be a basic conceptual problem inherent in the 
expression "jurisdiction." Secondly, the use of the term may also 
vary with the different meanings ascribed to it by the user. Lastly, 
there is traditionally more than one type of jurisdiction that ap-
pears to be highly relevant to any consideration of international 
terrorism. The problem whether a State has jurisdiction to arrest, 
to prosecute or to punish an alleged off ender, may therefore be 
tackled in these separate but closely related connections. 
A conceptual problem of paramount importance surrounds the 
expression "jurisdiction." The term has been used in several legal 
contexts, not necessarily interconnected. In its etymological sense, 
"jurisdiction" is a combination of "jus" - "juris" and "dicere" -
"dictio," literally the statement of the law or power to determine 
the right or what the law is on the point at issue, or the determina-
tion of the right or interest in question or the interpretation and 
48. See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, supra note 11, 
art. 2, para. 5, at 18. 
49. See id. art. 3, para. 1, at 19. 
50. Id. art. 3, para. 2, at 19. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. art. 3, para. 4, at 19. 
53. Id. art. 3, para. 5, at 19. 
54. Id. art. 3, para. 4, at 18. 
15
Sucharitkul: International Terrorism and the Problem of Jurisdiction
Published by SURFACE, 1987
156 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:141 
application of the law. H 
In international law, even from the classics of the law of na-
tions, the term "jurisdictio" or jurisdiction has been equated with 
"imperium" or sovereignty, as in the maxim par in parem non 
habet imperium or non habet jurisdictionem. In this sense, juris-
diction may be said to constitute one aspect of "sovereignty," or 
governmental authority of the State, for which an equivalent 
phrase adopted by the International Law Commission in connec-
tion with State responsibility is perogatives de la puissance 
publique.r.e 
In private international law, the expression "jurisdiction" re-
fers either to the term "legal system" or the territory in which an 
autonomous legal system operates. This meaning is conceptually 
different from that contained in the idea of imperium. 
In constitutional law, jurisdiction is exercisable by the three 
branches of the government more or less in conformity with the 
theory and practice of the separation of powers. G7 This may corre-
spond more closely to the different meanings ascribed to the differ-
ent types of jurisdiction under international law.GS 
The different uses of the same term in various branches or dis-
ciplines of the law have created some confusion of thought as well 
as of expression. Further complication has been added as the result 
of different usages of that terminology in the same context, or dis-
cipline, in public international law.Gt 
55. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ch. 10, at 820-90 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter L. HENKIN]. "Jurisdiction is com-
monly used to describe authority to affect legal interests." Id. 
56. See, e.g., Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 7, para. 2, reprinted in [1980) 
2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 31. Here, reference is made to an entity, which is empowered by the 
internal law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority (the French 
equivalent being, les prerogatives de la puissance publique or in Spanish, las prerogativas 
del podero publico, found in the French Annuaire and the Spanish Anuario, respectively). 
57. See A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (1984). 
58. See L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 820-21. Jurisdiction may be defined on several 
levels, namely, under municipal law and under international law. Under municipal, the leg-
islative, judicial and executive powers of the federal branches of government are defined 
first in the constitution, which sets the limits beyond the various branches of the federal 
and state government may not go. Conflict of laws rules within a federal union often define 
the limits of legislative, judicial and executive jurisdiction, not necessarily conterminous 
with constitutional limits. 
59. Users do not always express themselves with sufficient clarity when adopting the 
term "jurisdiction." See id. at 820. Usages of publicists in this country merely distinguish 
between enfo~cement and prescriptive jurisdiction which appears to include power to adju-
dicate. Id. 
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2. The Problem of Interpretation of the Types of Jurisdiction in 
International Law 
The meanings of jurisdiction in international law also vary 
with the types of jurisdictional authority exercised by the different 
organs of the State. In principle, it would be misleading and inac-
curate not to recognize and identify the types of jurisdiction in-
volved or invoked. There are at least three aspects of jurisdiction 
in the context of international terrorism. 
(a) Prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction refers to the author-
ity to prescribe the rules of conduct for individuals and officials 
within or without the State, as well as for the State organs, agen-
cies or instrumentalities of government. This capacity to legislate 
or to prescribe rules of conduct is not confined to the power exer-
cisable by the legislatures, but also by other institutions of govern-
ment such as administrative agencies, and even courts. 
(b) Adjudicative or judicial jurisdiction means the power to 
adjudicate or determine a legal conflict or dispute, such as the au-
thority of a court of law to decide whether an offense has been 
committed or to determine the guilt or reaffirm the innocence of 
an accused person. Jurisdiction may be found lacking in any given 
case on several grounds, either ratione personae or ratione mater-
iae. 60 Jurisdiction to adjudicate may be defined as the authority of 
a State to subject particular persons or things to its judicial 
process.81 
(c) Executive or enforcement jurisdiction denotes the admin-
istrative or executive authority of the State to prevent and sup-
press the commission of any offense against the law of nations or of 
any other crime, including the power to arrest, apprehend, prose-
cute and execute orders or judgments of the court. 82 This is some-
times defined as "the capacity ... to enforce a rule of law, whether 
this capacity be exercised by the judicial or the executive 
branch. "88 
60. Jurisdiction may be based on ratione materiae, i.e., on the ground of or by reason 
of the subject matter or nature of the offense, its seriousness, its place of commission, the 
punishability of the offense and its territorial connection. Jurisdiction may also be based on 
ratione personae, i.e., on the person or personality, including status and nationality of the 
alleged offender. 
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 6 pt. I, introductory note 
(1965). The Restatement prefers the expression jurisdiction to adjudicate over the term ju-
dicial jurisdiction. 
62. Id. Jurisdiction to enforce also c.overs the power to cooperate with other nations in 
the investigation, apprehension and extradition or exchange of alleged offenders or convicts. 
63. Id. Jurisdiction to enforce is defined as the authority of a State "to use the re-
17
Sucharitkul: International Terrorism and the Problem of Jurisdiction
Published by SURFACE, 1987
158 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:141 
Thus, the terms "legislative," "judicial" and "executive" juris-
diction may be used interchangeably with the expressions "juris-
diction" to prescribe, to adjudicate and to enforce, regardless of 
the governmental institution exercising the power. 
B. CAUSES OF THE JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM 
Several causes seem to have contributed to the problem of ju-
risdiction in connection with international terrorism. Before ana-
lyzing the problem or attempting any solution, it appears useful to 
examine the origin or root-causes of the problem which may be 
attributable to a number of salient facts. 
1. Absence of a Comprehensive Set of Rules in International 
Law Defining with Precision all Types of Jurisdiction 
International law has not developed or prescribed a complete 
set of norms delimiting the scope of jurisdiction that each State 
may exercise whether in the form of jurisdiction to legislate, to ad-
judicate or to enforce.64 That is true also of international organiza-
tions which may have been vested with some of the attributes of 
State jurisdiction.61 International law has been relatively silent on 
the limits of prescriptive, adjudicative and executive jurisdiction of 
each State or international institution in civil and criminal matters 
generally, although attention has been paid more particularly to 
the outer-limits of State jurisdiction in criminal matters.66 
2. Lack of Uniformity in State Practice 
Each State is sovereign within its own borders. Yet, States 
have prescribed laws with extraterritorial effects; have sought to 
adjudicate disputes in civil litigation with little or no territorial 
connection or to prosecute and try persons accused of crimes com-
mitted outside their territorial confines, and at times even to en-
sources of government to induce or compel compliance with its law." 
64. See L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 821. Compare the classic dictum of Chief Justice 
Marshall in Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812). Juris-
diction appears to be unlimited even by territorial confines of the State. 
65. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations, Mar. 22, 1986, Conf. A. 129/15. 
66. More emphasis is placed on the validity or impropriety of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion based on considerations other than territorial connections as in the famous Mexican 
case concerning Mr. Cutting, an American national accused of criminal libel in Texas, in 
1887. See 2 J. MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 201, at 228 (1906); The Lotus Case, 
Concerning Criminal Negligence on the High Seas, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 5 (1927). 
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force such decisions beyond their national borders. 67 The extent to 
which States tend to legislate, adjudicate and enforce measures 
outside their territory is far from uniform. While for historical or 
geopolitical reasons some countries are shy of exercising jurisdic-
tion extraterritorially, others appear to enjoy such extravagant lux-
ury of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 68 The end results point to a 
marked absence of consistency in State practice. 
3. Emergence of the Jurisdictional Problem 
Divergency in State practice regarding the limits of national 
jurisdiction in different forms has given rise to a serious problem 
in connection with the need to arrest, try and punish international 
terrorists. The problem of jurisdiction may arise in more ways than 
one. 
(a) The gap or vacuum in national jurisdiction 
Because of the diversity of State practice in the quality and 
extent of the authority to prescribe, the capacity to adjudicate and 
the power to enforce, it may happen that in a given circumstance 
or case, no State appears to have jurisdiction or to be competent to 
exercise jurisdiction at a particular phase of the proceedings. For 
example, before the Hague Convention of 1970,69 a terrorist hi-
jacking an aircraft in flight over the high seas could be free of any 
jurisdiction upon landing in a third State that had no provision in 
its criminal code making hijacking or seizure of aircraft in flight or 
over the high seas a punishable offense. The offense was commited 
in no man's land, that is, beyond national jurisdiction of any State. 
67. For criminal matters, an example would be the Eichman case. See Note, Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Prece-
dent in International Law, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (1974), concerning the amendment of 
Israel Penal Law in 1972, adopted by the Knesset on the 6th Nisau, 5732 (Mar. 21, 1972), 
Sefer Ha-Chukkim 52. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) 404; Security Council Report to the 
General Assembly in the Eichman Case, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 2) at 19-24, U.N. Doc. 
A/4494; Security Council Resolution S/4349. Compare Anti~Terrorism Act of 1986: Hearing 
on H.R. 4294 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 
68. After the establishment of the capitulations regime or extraterritoriality in Turkey, 
China, Japan and Siam, the Western powers, including the United States and subsequently 
even Japan, seemed to enjoy extraterritorial rights and jurisdiction over their respective 
nationals in distant Asian Lands. See British Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Viet. 
286, ch. 37, §§ 1-2, providing for inter alia, exercise of jurisdiction in foreign country and 
power to assign jurisdiction to British courts in cases within the act. 
69. Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, supra note 47. M~re than 120 States have 
ratified the Convention. 
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There was no jurisdiction to arrest, or prosecute as the act was not 
considered a criminal offense; hence there was no subject matter 
jurisdi~tion to begin with. Nor would the terrorist be arrested 
where landing occurred, since there was no authority to arrest a 
person who in the eyes · of the State had committed no offense 
against its law or the law of nations. 
The situtation has improved somewhat in like circumstances 
for countries having ratified the Hague Convention of 1970.70 
There would be an obligation under Articles 2 and 4 of the Con-
vention to pass legislation to create jurisdiction to prosecute and 
punish such offenses as hijacking or seizure of aircraft in flight by a 
number of States including the State of registration as well as the 
State in whose territory the aircraft has landed, the State of desti-
nation, where the alleged off ender is present, and the State of 
transit after landing. 71 Of course, the State of registration normally 
would have jurisdiction, the problem was the lack of capacity to 
arrest the accused without his physical presence in the territory of 
the forum State after the commission of the offense. Such a gap or 
vacuum does exist and may exist in countless imaginable cirucm-
stances, and States have endeavored to bridge the gap or to fill the 
vacuum with jurisdiction. 
In some systems, there may be jurisdiction to prosecute and to 
try an accused person in absentia, but without physical presence 
of the accused person, enforcement or punishment would not be 
possible. This defect could be cured by cooperation of a third State 
through the process of extradition which presents another major 
problem in the suppression and punishment of international ter-
rorism. If at any time during any stage of the proceedings a vac-
uum in the jurisdiction occurs, the defect becomes incurable. Ex-
tradition cannot proceed if, in the substantive law of the requested 
State, the offense is not considered to be a crime or punishable 
offense, or indeed an extraditable offense. 72 
70. Id. An increasing number of States are now either jointly owning or operating na-
tional airlines, such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden (SAS); individually operating na-
tional lines, such as Thailand, Singapore, Kuwait, Republic of Korea and U.S.S.R.; or sup-
porting private-owned national carriers or flag lines, such as the United States (TWA, 
PanAm, United, American, etc.), United Kingdom (British Caledonia), France (UTA) and 
the Netherlands (KLM). 
71. See id. arts. 1-3, 7-8. 
72. For a more detailed examination of the problem of extradition, see infra notes 133-
53 and accompanying text. 
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(b) Overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction 
Another problem area may be identified in connection with 
the extension of jurisdiction by one State which overlaps that of 
another State, both claiming to exercise the authority to prosecute, 
to adjudicate and to punish the off ender. This is not uncommon in 
transboundary crimes and torts where the locus delicti commissi 
may cover more than one territory, or where the injured party may 
have the nationality of one State, the offender being a national of 
another State. Two or more States may have concurrent jurisdic-
tion for various reasons which provide different grounds or bases 
for jurisdiction. 73 
In the case of concurrent jurisdiction, the State with the cus-
tody of the accused or where the defendant can be located appears 
to have an upper hand in the exercise of jurisdiction if it wishes to 
apprehend and prosecute, or to allow proceedings to be initiated. 
Other States will have to try the case in the absence of the defend-
ant or, in penal matters, to request extradition which may or may 
not be accorded,7" depending on numerous factors to be taken into 
consideration. In the final analysis, physical presence of the de-
fendant or the accused is crucial in criminal cases although not in-
dispensable in civil matters. The State with the custody of the al-
leged offender may have several options, aut dedere (to extradite), 
73. Not only is this common in all cases of transboundary crimes or conspiracy taking 
place in more than one State, but in all cases involving members of foreign visiting forces; 
the .local criminal courts as well as the commanding officer of the sending State would retain 
concurrent jurisdiction over the alleged off enders. Arrangements are often made in the form 
of Status of Forces Agreements, as in the following treaties: Agreement under Article VI of 
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of 
United States Armed Forces in Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, United States-Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1652, 
T.l.A.S. No. 4510; Agreement Respecting the Status of the Korean Service Corps, Feb. 23, 
1967, United States-Korea, 18 U.S.T. 249, T.l.A.S. No. 6226. See also Status of NATO 
Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.l.A.S. No. 2846; Application of NATO 
Status of Forces Agreement to United States Forces at Leased Bases, Apr. 28, 1952, United 
States-Canada, 5 U.S.T. 2139, T.l.A.S. No. 3074; Agreement Regarding the Status of Per-
sonnel of Military Assistance Advisory Group and Offshore Procurement Program, Dec. 12, 
1956, United States-Denmark, 9 U.S.T. 271, T.l.A.S. No. 4002; Agreement Regarding the 
Status of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Apr. 13, 1954, United States-Norway, 5 
U.S.T. 619, T.l.A.S. No. 2950; Agreement Concerning the Status of the United States Forces 
in Greece, Sept. 7, 1956, United States-Greece, 7 U.S.T. 2555, T.l.A.S. No. 3649; Agreement 
Regarding the Stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Netherlands, Aug. 13, 1954, 
United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 103, T.l.A.S. No. 3174; Agreement Regarding the Sta-
tus of United States Forces in Turkey, June 19, 1951, United States-Turkey, 5 U.S.T. 1465, 
T.l.A.S. No. 3020. 
74. For a more detailed examination of the problem of extradition, see infra notes 133-
53 and accompanying text. 
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aut judicare (to prosecute, adjudicate), or to release the detainee 
on various grounds including political expediency or humanitarian 
consideration. n 
To facilitate closer cooperation in this area, a series of bilat-
eral treaties has been negotiated and concluded by States to make 
appropriate adjustment with regard to priority or necessity to 
bring to justice a person responsible for a crime.76 Multilateral con-
ventions or regional arrangements sometimes provide for the allo-
cation or division of concurrent jurisdiction. 77 
(c) Confiict of jurisdictions 
The problem is more acute when overlapping jurisdiction con-
tains an element of conflict. In The Lotus Case,78 the Court of 
Turkey had tried and condemned Monsieur Demons, a French-
man, for criminal negligence which took place on the high seas 
against a Turkish vessel. The French Government objected 
strongly to the exercise of Turkish jurisdiction on the ground that 
the Court of the Flag State (France) had exclusive jurisdiction to 
try the master or members of the crew of the S.S. Lotus, the vessel 
Demons was on. This conflict had to qe resolved by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. The court by a dubious majority of 
five, plus one ad hoc judge, plus the casting vote of President Max 
Huber, to six, including British, French and American Judges, 
found for Turkey. 
To a limited extent, the decision may have been partially over-
ruled by the adoption of a different ruling by the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas,79 as confirmed by the 1982 U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.80 These conventions codify ex-
75. For instances of actual decisions in connection with the political offense exception, 
see infra notes 152-61. 
76. An excellent example is the Supplementary Treaty concerning Extradition, United 
States- United Kingdom, June 25, 1985, 87 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 87 (Feb. 1987) (entered into 
force Dec. 23, 1986). Ratification of the treaty passed by a vote of 87-10. See 132 Cong. Rec. 
9273. The United Kingdom approved the amended version on November 25, 1986. See also 
Talcolt, Questions of Justice: U.S. Courts. Powers of Inquiry under Article 3(a) of the 
U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 274 (1987). 
77. See Status of NATO Forces Agreement, supra note 73. 
78. 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10. 
79. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.l.A.S. 
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, arts. 5-6, 11 [hereinafter 1958 Geneva Convention]. 
80. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/ 
122, arts. 92, 94, 97, reprinted in 211.L.M. 1261, 1287-88 (1982). This convention was signed 
by 159 . States, and was intended to replace the four 1958 Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea. This part of the convention represents the codification of existing custom. 
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isting rules of customary international law. The prevailing ruling 
appears to be that no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be in-
stituted against the master or any other person in the service of 
the ship in the event of a collision or other incident of navigation 
concerning a ship on the high seas except before the judicial or 
administrative authorities either of the flag State or of the State of 
which person is a national.81 This was the ruling adopted earlier by 
another Convention on Collision at Sea. 82 
In a different context, however, the dictum of the court re-
garding the nearly unlimited power of a State to legislate, to adju-
dicate and even to enforce measures affecting the interests of for-
eigners beyond its own territories has not been rejected. On the 
contrary, recent developments show an increasing tendency on the 
part of States to extend their jurisdiction over crimes or torts com-
mitted by non-nationals and non-residents outside their territorial 
confines, especially in order to protect the nations' interests or 
those of their nationals or residents. 83 
Such conflict is not often resolved by judicial instance. The 
Lotus Case was an exception rather than a rule, having regard to 
the treaty between France and Turkey establishing compulsory ju-
risdiction of the Permanent Court in matters of conflict of jurisdic-
tion, resulting from differing interpretation of the bilateral treaty, 
81. See id. art. 97, para. 1, at 1288; 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 79, art. 11(1). 
82. The Brussels Maritime Convention of 1952 for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collisions, 439 U.N.T.S. 233; see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 502 (rev. tent. draft no. 3, 1982), on the rights 
and duties of the flag State. 
83. See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, H.R. 4294, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). This 
legislation is avowedly based on the protective principle, following the adoption of the new § 
351 of the U.S. Criminal Code. See 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1971). This section covers offenses 
directed at members of Congress, and makes it an indictable offense for a foreigner to attack 
a member of U.S. Congress anywhere in the world, since the U.S. Government protested 
against the passive nationality principle relied upon by Mexico in the Cutting case in 1887, 
exactly 100 years ago. See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 66, § 201, at 228. 
France reluctantly adopted a change of heart by similarly amending its Code of Penal 
Procedure on July 11, 1975 (D.L., 1978-79), half a century after vainly instituting proceed-
ings against Turkey in 1927, in The Lotus Case. 
The United Kingdom has also abandoned its former position as reflected in its objec-
tion to the Netherlands position in the Costa Rica Packet Arbitration in 1888 (87 BRITISH 
AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 21, Ad. 89, and 1181), seeing that virtually all the "civilized 
nations" have actually followed the traditions established by Asian, African and Latin 
American practices. For the dispute concerning the extraterritorial application of the U.S. 
antitrust law, see Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust 
Laws, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146; Editorial, Extraterritorial Application of United States 
Legislation Against Restrictive or Unfair Trade Practices, 51 A.J.l.L. 380 (1957); see also 
INT'L LAW ASSOCIATION, REP. ON THE 51ST CONFERENCE 304 (1964). 
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failing which there would be little opportunity for an international 
judicial settlement. 84 In the absence of agreement between the par-
ties to submit their dispute for determination by the International 
Court of Justice or by arbitration, or by other means of dispute 
settlement, solution would have to be found elsewhere. Negotia-
tions or agreements between the States concerned may provide the 
ultimate satisfaction to the affected parties. 
C. PROSPECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM 
The causes of the problem are related essentially to two pos-
sibilities: absence of jurisdiction and overlapping or conflicting 
jurisdiction. 
A salutary solution to the absence of jurisdiction is to create 
one where none has existed as in various conventions on unlawful 
seizure of aircraft,8~ the taking of hostages,86 crimes against inter-
nationally protected persons including diplomatic agents,87 or 
other acts of international terrorism. 88 States have been invited to 
ratify a number of terrorism-related conventions in order to fulfill 
their obligations to prevent, preempt and suppress acts of terror-
ism by leaving no hole nor loophole in their jurisdiction. 89 
84. Article 15 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of July 24, 1923, provides that "all ques-
tions of jurisdiction shall, as between Turkey and the other contracting Powers, be decided 
in accordance with the principles of international law." Turkey and France agreed in a com-
promise to submit the dispute to the P.C.l.J .. 
85. See, e.g., Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.1.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter the 
Tokyo Convention]; The Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, supra note 47; Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 
U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 I.L.M. 1151 [hereinafter Montreal (Sabotage) Convention 
of 1971). 
86. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, U.N. Doc. 
A/34/819, reprinted in 74 A.J.I.L. 277 (1980). 
87. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes, supra note 43. 
88. See European Convention, supra note 43; Measures to Prevent International Ter-
rorism, G.A. Res. 40/61 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 239 (1986). 
89. Such a gap has existed in several penal codes which have had to be amended or 
supplemented by subsequent legislation, either following adoption of an international con-
vention or generally enabling the courts to exercise jurisdiction in furtherance of conven-
tional or treaty provisions. For instance, Article 694 of the Code de Procedure Penale of 
France, July 11, 1975 (Dalloz 1978-79) extends the seldom applied passive personality juris-
diction as well as widens the scope of protective jurisdiction to cover extraterritorial activi-
ties endangering French diplomatic and consular posts and agents. See Bigay, Les disposi-
tions nouvelles de competence des jurisdictions fran<;aises a l'egard des infractions 
commises a letranger, D.S.L. 51-52 (1976). The amendment enables the court to give effect 
to obligations arising from France's ratification of anti-terrorism conventions, such as the 
Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, and the Montreal (Sabotage) Convention of 1971, as 
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The problem area that is more complex and not easy to settle 
is that of concurrent or conflicting jurisdiction. Here again, cooper-
ation among States is required to explore and identify the most 
suitable means to resolve the jurisdictional problem, including the 
simplification of procedures and facilities for extradition or trans-
fer of the alleged offenders. Clearly, the creation of an interna-
tional criminal court90 may provide a solution to both problems, 
either lack of or excess of jurisdiction. But the likelihood of general 
acceptance of such a court is somewhat remote.91 Besides, it would 
not solve the problem in every case where there is a conflict of 
jurisdiction, especially if one State insists on its exclusive right to 
try the offender or that at least the offender be either extradited or 
tried by the requested State. 
A different solution was adopted in the colonial era where 
chunks of territories were transferred to or annexed by a Western 
Power with authority to legislate, adjudicate and enforce over the 
entire territory.92 In some instances short of annexation, a regime 
of capitulations or extraterritoriality was established without the 
possibility of conflict or concurrence of jurisdiction. 93 The Colonial 
Power or the State concluding such an archaic and unequal treaty 
would thereby enjoy exclusive territorial jurisdiction over its own 
territory and extraterritorial jurisdiction over the territory of an-
other sovereign State to the exclusion of the latter in all matters 
affecting the interests of nationals or subjects of the Colonial 
Power. Such a regime was abolished in various parts of Asia in-
cluding China, Japan, Thailand and Turkey by the close of World 
War II, after adoption of respective penal and civil codes by Asian 
well as other international conventions. See supra note 85. 
90. See, e.g., Geneva Convention of 1937, supra note 3; Brierly, Do We Need an Inter-
national Criminal Court?, 1927 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 81-88. 
91. Not unlike the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism of 
1937, the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court was also signed in 
1937 at Geneva. This was not due to a lack of enthusiasm or support, but rather to the 
interruption of World War II. For earlier endeavors to set up such a court, see Brierly, 
supra note 90, at 81-88; M. BASSIOUNI, DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRI-
BUNAL (1987) . 
92. For the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Asia in the 19th century or 
regime of capitulations in Turkey, see G. GONG, THE STANDARD OF "CIVILIZATION" IN INTER-
NATIONAL SOCIETY (1984). 
93. There could be no conflict nor indeed concurrence of jurisdiction, since the West-
ern powers enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over their nationals and subjects while remaining 
in or traveling through the territories of Asian nations, the local sovereigns, having waived 
not only their jurisdiction to try certain cases involving foreign interests, but also suspended 
the application of their own laws in favor of the lex patriae or the national law of the aliens 
presumed by treaty to be extraterritorial. 
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countries, 94 patterned after European systems. 
This solution was an imposition by Colonial Powers and was 
unequal, unjust and far from satisfactory. It is now outmoded since 
General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) on the granting of inde-
pendence. The process of decolonization is now irreversible. 91 
Thus, agreement to subject a State to a regime of extraterritorial-
ity would be invalid today for violation of a peremptory norm 
which admits of no derogation. 96 
The only possible solution left open appears to rest with the 
obligation of States to cooperate and to negotiate in good faith. 
Many have reached agreement in the adjustment of their respec-
tive rights and obligations to request and to comply with a request 
for extradition.97 Extradition then has become an affordable solu-
tion sought after on a multilateral as well as bilateral basis.98 It is 
flexible enough to give satisfaction for all concerned. The problem 
of extradition remains to be examined in the light of current legal 
developments and recent State practice, especially with regard to 
the exception of "international terrorism" to the "political offense 
exemption" from extradition.99 
94. See, e.g., F. PIGGOTT, EXTRATERRITORIALITY: THE LAW RELATING TO CONSULAR JURIS-
DICTION AND RESIDENCE IN ORIENTAL COUNTRIES (1892). 
95. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
G.A. Res. 1514(XV). For the implementation of the Declaration, see G.A. Res. 2465(XXIII) 
(Dec. 20, 1968); G.A. Res. 2548(XXIV) (Dec. 11, 1969); G.A. Res. 2708(XXV), (Dec. 14, 
1970); Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration, G.A. Res. 
262(XXV) (Oct. 12, 1970). 
96. See Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1969, arts. 53, 64 (jus cogens) (entry 
into force Jan. 27, 1980); WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 236-62 (3d ed.). 
97. In Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933), the Supreme Court noted that 
the "prindples of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty." 
This statement appears to reflect adequately the situation prevailing in 1933 which probably 
remains true today. In the United States, extradition is a matter for the Federal Govern-
ment and is governed by federal law under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184-3195; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,§§ 476-479 (rev. tent. draft no. 7, 1986); C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TIONAL EXTRADITION (1983); MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUDIES, TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1983). 
98. For examples of bilateral treaties, see, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, United States-
Brazil, Jan. 13, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.l.A.S. No. 5691, 532 U.N.T.S. 177; Supplementary 
Extradition Treaty, United States-United Kingdom, Dec. 23, 1986, 87 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 89 
(Feb. 1987). For multilateral conventions, see, e.g., Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 
A.J.I.L. 81-86 (Special Supp. 1935); O.A.S. Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 
25, 1981 (Caracus), O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/36 (SEPF), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 723 (1981); 
European Agreement concerning the Application of the European Convention on the Sup-
pression of Terrorism, Dec. 4, 1979, 19 l.L.M. 325 (1980); European Convention, supra note 
43; 0.A.S. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 
3949, T.l.A.S. No. 8413. 
99. See infra notes 142-72 and accompanying text. 
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IV. PERMISSIBLE LEGAL BASES OF JURISDICTION 
A survey of State practice and legal theories appears to sug-
gest a number of permissible legal bases of jurisdiction in its en-
tirety, including the authority to prescribe, the power to adjudicate 
and the capacity to enforce.10° For convenience, the bases of juris-
diction may be classified under five headings with some overlap.101 
A. THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE 
By far the most cogent and solid foundation for the exercise of 
jurisdiction is the territorial principle, traceable to the more basic 
principle of sovereignty as source of State authority itself.102 Terri-
torial sovereignty is the strongest of all the bases of jurisdiction 
and would easily take precedence over other concurrent or compet-
itive principles. As far as enforcement or executive jurisdiction is 
concerned, the principle of territoriality is absolutely supreme and 
as such is exclusive of other principles. The only possible exception 
must be based on an equally basic norm, namely, the sovereign will 
of the State itself. Thus, a State may consent to any proposition, 
or agree to waive any part of its sovereign authority even in respect 
of activities within its own territory in favor of the exercise by an-
other State of an aspect of sovereignty.103 This consent is nearly 
absolute, subject only to the reservation that it does not contra-
vene a peremptory norm out of which no State could opt through 
unilateral or mutual consent.10• 
The territorial principle is valid for civil as well as criminal or 
penal matters. Territoriality or the locus delicti commissi provides 
a clear and firm basis for all the three forms of jurisdiction. The 
last which is enforcement jurisdiction could be preventive, sup-
pressive or even punitive.10& In civil as well as criminal cases, the 
100. See Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 A.J.I.L. 443-65 (Supp. pt. II, 1935) 
(introductory comment by Professor Edwin D. Dickinson). 
101. For current legal and policy problems, see, e.g., Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Con-
fiicts between Soveriegn Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487-503 (1985). 
102. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 
(1812). In dictum, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that, "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation 
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limita-
tion not imposed by itself .... All exceptions therefore to the full and complete power of a 
nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself." 
103. See id. 
104. See supra note 96. 
105. See, e.g., de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, U.S., 105 S. Ct. 2656 (1985) (action for personal injury resulting from car explosion). 
See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (death by torture abroad may 
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territorial connections need not be confined to one and the same 
State. A crime may be committed across the boundary line as in 
transfrontier offenses or transboundary torts. The territorial con-
nections in civil liability may refer to the domicile of one of the 
parties litigants, or the situs of the property in dispute or the place 
of celebration of marriage or performance of a contract. Further-
more, in criminal matters the physicial notion of the locus delicti 
commissi may be extended by legal fiction or theory.106 
Thus, the territorial principle, in this context, has been ex-
tended to include the following: 
(a) The objective territorial principle, by reference to 
the location of the object or victim of the offense or 
tortious act within the State of the f orum.101 
(b) The effect doctrine, by reference to the effect pro-
duced in the territory of the forum State.108 
(c) The subjective territorial principle, by reference to 
the locality of the actor, the subject or author of the 
offense being located in the State of the forum. 109 
( d) Plurality of localities of acts constituting the of-
fense by holding the locality of each act as the locus 
delicti commissi, although other acts forming part of 
the offense were performed outside the territory of 
that State. 110 
create basis for jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act). But see Siderman v. Republic 
of Argentina, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985); Agora: What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79 
A.J.l.L. 106-07 (1985) (death by torture abroad, no jurisdiction under either Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (F.S.l.A.) of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606, or Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 
u.s.c. § 1350 (1982). 
106. See, e.g., The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 10, where the locus delicti 
commissi was held to be on board the Turkish vessel, based on the effect doctrine of the 
territorial principle, and fictitious equation of a vessel on the high seas as a floating 
territory. 
107. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (1985) (territorial applicability). 
108. See id. §§ (l)(e)-(f); The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 10. For a discus-
sion of the objective territorial jurisdiction and the effect doctrine, see M. McDOUGAL & W. 
REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE - THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE 
WORLD COMMUNITY 1319-68, 1385-92 (1981); Paust, The Mexican Oil Spill: Jurisdiction, Im-
munity, and Acts of State, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 239, 240-44 (1979). 
109. See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 66, § 201. Moore distinguished between the locality of 
the act and the locality of the actor, in the Cutting case. 
110. See Hammond v. Sittel, 59 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1932), recognizing both the 
effect doctrine and the continuing act theory as bases for jurisdiction. Compare Morau v. 
United States, 264 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir. 1920) (theft of ship or goods could constitute 
continuing act for purpose of jurisdiction in every successive place to which the vessel was 
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(e) The fiction of territoriality, by deeming a seagoing 
vessel to be a "floating territory" of a State, thereby 
injury suffered on board the vessel, even on the high-
seas, could be regarded fictitiously on the objective ter-
ritorial principle as occurring in the territory of the 
flag State; likewise an aircraft could be deemed a flying 
territory of the State of registration or user State. m 
B. THE NATIONALITY OR PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE 
169 
Side by side with the principle of territoriality has developed 
the nationality or personality principle. Jurisdiction is exercised in 
all forms and manifestations ratione personae, i.e., by reason of 
the personality involved. For the status and capacity of persons, 
the lex patriae would appear to govern. Nationality provides a 
sound basis for jurisdiction also in criminal matters. For the pre-
sent purposes, the nationality principle includes the following: 
(a) Active nationality principle, by reference to the na-
tionality of the accused or alleged off ender, this is applicable to a 
large extent by most systems including the common law 
countries.112 
(b) Passive personality principle, by reference to the na-
tionality of the victim of a crime or the injured party. This princi-
ple which was adopted by Mexico in the Cutting Case113 and Tur-
key half a century later in The Lotus Case114 has given rise to 
much objection and criticism on the part of common law 
countries.116 
It might come as a surprise to those who still resist the 
passive personality principle in the combat of international terror-
carried). 
111. See, e.g., The Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10. To compare the construc-
tive presence theory, as distinct from personal presence, see Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 
347, 362 (1912). In Hyde, constructive presence was assigned to conspirators as well as other 
criminals. For jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed on board an aircraft or by an 
aircraft or space object, the flag or registration connection may be reinforced by the fact of 
control or use by the State responsible. The territorial connection is expanded to cover also 
other forms of linkage such as registration, lease, use or control of the craft. 
112. See, e.g., McCleoud v. Attorney General of New South Wales, App. Cas. 455, 457 
(1891). Note especially the sweeping reservation of Lord Halsbury, "except over her own 
subjects." (emphasis added). 
113. See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 66, § 201. 
114. See 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10; Turkish Penal Code, art. 6. 
115. See R. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63,117 (the Franconia), where Amphlett, J.A. believed it 
to be an established and undisputed proposition that "a foreigner committing an offence of 
any kind, even against an Englishman, on foreign territory cannot be tried for it in an Eng-
lish Court." 
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ism to learn that even more than half a century ago the trend had 
already been against such resistance. There were even then more 
countries applying than rejecting it. Now the trend becomes much 
more irresistible, and most enlightened governments support the 
principle. The most adamant resistance has weakened in France in 
Article 694 of the Code de Procedure Penale of 1975,116 in the U.S. 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986,117 and in the Criminal Code of Thai-
land.118Although not every State has adopted the passive personal-
ity principle in their criminal legislation, it can no longer be said 
that remaining opposition is realistic. 
(c) The extended notion of nationality, attributes per-
sonality or nationality to something other than a natural person, 
such as a corporate personality, a ship of war, a merchant vessel, 
an aircraft or spacecraft. 119 This theory extends the scope of an 
already artificial notion of nationality or juridical personality to in-
animate but, intangible objects as well as incorporeal heredita-
ments, including several forms of assets as well as intellectual 
property rights protected by the law of the State of registration 
with the extended notion of nationality, jurisdiction may also be 
enlarged. 
C. THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE 
Reference may be made to the national interests affected or 
injured by an offense, such as national security, or other vital polit-
ical, economic or financial interest of the State of the forum. Juris-
diction in all forms may be exercised on the basis of the necessity 
to protect one of the above national interests.120 In the practice of 
some systems, such as the one in United States, the protective 
116. Law of July 11, 1975, No. 75-624, art. 189, C. PR. PEN. (Dalloz 1975). The Penal 
Code specifically refers to cases where the victim of the crime is a French national. 
117. Terrorist Acts against U.S. Nationals Abroad, 99th Cong. H.R. 3712, § 2332, H.R. 
4288, authorizing the prosecution of terrorists who attack U.S. nationals abroad. 
118. See Criminal Code of Thailand, B.E. 2499, sec. 4 (Territorial principle), sec. 5 
(Objective territorial principle and effect doctrine), sec. 6 (Plurality of localities of acts), sec. 
7 (Protective principle, for selected offences, security, forgery, robbery and universality prin-
ciple, piracy), sec. 8 (Nationality principle (i) active and (ii) passive). Thailand's Criminal 
Code appears to have adopted all the five principles without any hesitation. These provi-
sions were taken from the best of European, Japanese and Latin American models. 
119. See supra note 114. The fiction of "floating territory" of a vessel in Lotus is no 
different from the fiction of nationality attributable already to the vessel through the flag it 
flies. 
120. See, e.g., Petersen, The Extraterritorial Effect of Federal Criminal Statutes: Of-
fences Directed at Members of Congress, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 773-802 (1982-
83); §351 U.S. Crim. C.; 18 U.S.C. ss. 35 (1971). 
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principle tends to overlap the passive personality principle long 
discredited since the Cutting Case, but re-instated and revived 
under the preferred designation of protective principle, as the pre-
amble of the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, clearly reflects.121 
D. THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE 
Reference may be made to the universal character of the of-
fense made justiciable by the law of nations. The principle of 
universality includes such offenses as piracy jure gentium, 122 geno-
cide, 123 slave trade, 124 and narcotics trafficking.1n The offense 
under this heading is seen as an offense against the international 
community as a whole. Offenses against the peace and security of 
mankind including war crimes may also be viewed in the same 
light.126 In this way, terrorism is not an infrequent phenomenon 
accompanying the commission of such offenses against the law of 
nations, and in most circumstances a terrorist may be arrested, 
prosecuted and tried under the Universal Principle, regardless of 
the locus delicti commissi, so long only as the offender can be 
physically apprehended.127 International cooperation is recom-
121. See Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, § 2731, H.R. 4294, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). 
Findings and Purpose: over 8,000 incidents of international terrorism were noted, more than 
half were directed against American targets. A country may prosecute crimes committed 
outside its boundaries that are directed against its own security or the operation of its gov-
ernmental functions. Terrorist attacks on Americans abroad threaten a fundamental func-
tion of the U.S. Government; that of protecting its citizens; such attacks also threaten the 
ability of the U.S. to implement and maintain an effective foreign policy; terrorist attacks 
further interfere with inter-state and foreign commerce, threatening business travel and 
tourism as well as trade relations. 
122. See Note, Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 
v A. J. INT1L L. 723 (1986). 
123. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
G.A. Res. 2670, 3 U.N. GAOR (Pt. 1) at 124, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (entered into force Jan. 
12, 1951) [hereinafter Convention on Genocide]. 
124. See Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention Signed at Geneva On September 
25, 1926, Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, T.l.A.S. No. 3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51. Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institution and Practices Sim-
ilar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.l.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (1956) . 
. 125. See 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 80, arts. 108, 109; 
United States v. Dominiquez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979). 
126. See, e.g., Convention on Genocide, supra note 123; Geneva Conventions Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 31; International Conven-
tion on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 
3068(XXVIII), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (entered into force July 18, 1976). The United 
States was one of the four States voting against the resolution. 
127. See supra note 125; 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 79, art. 19; 1982 U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 80, art. 105. 
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mended for the suppression and punishment of the offenses. 
E. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT 
The principle of consent is applicable in practice for civil cases 
as well as for criminal matters. For civil litigation, jurisdiction may 
be exercised by several fora, among which should be mentioned the 
forum rei sitae128 (where the property is situated), the forum con-
nexitatis129 (where there is a close connection) and the forum 
prorogatum 130 (where the parties have elected to submit their dis-
putes). The parties have not only the choice of law, but also the 
choice of forum, subject to public policy of the forum or other 
rules, such as forum non conveniens, non-justiciability and the act 
of State doctrine. In addition, the forum State may also seize a 
property or arrest a vessel ad fundandam jurisdictionem.181 But 
such seizure may not be recognized by other jurisdictions. 
In criminal matters, it is not the consent of the parties that 
matters. Rather the consent of the State, having priority to arrest, 
prosecute and punish the offender, may afford the basis for an-
other State, with or without physical custody of the alleged of-
fender, to either arrest and prosecute or make a request for extra-
dition or start extradition proceedings as the case may be. 132 
128. Since the lex situs or the law of the place where the property is situated deter-
mines most if not all questions relating to property rights, the forum rei sitae is generally 
the appropriate court of competence to examine most cases involving rights to immovable 
and movable properties. 
129. The court may be considered competent to try a case under private international 
law because the proceeding involves legal issues with which by reason of the nationality of 
the parties to the litigation, their domicile or situs of the property in dispute or a combina-
tion of these criteria, it has substantial if not the closest connection. 
130. The theory of forum prorogatum commonly known in private international law as 
the doctrine of the chosen forum is also applicable in international transactions or disputes 
to which States are also parties. See, e.g., Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Alb.) 
1948 I.C.J. Pleadings (1 Corfu Channel) 15 (where subsequent special agreement of the Par-
ties replaced the Court's prorogated jurisdiction). 
131. See, e.g., I Congreso del Partido Case [1981] W.L.R. 382l(H.L.) , where two sister 
ships, the Playa Larga and the Marble Islands, were arrested. The court found jurisdiction 
(ad fundandam jurisdictionem) against the owners and persons interested in the I Congreso 
del Partido, in relation to transactions concluded by them, the I Congreso del Partido being 
a ship belonging to the same Cuban fleet. The Playa Larga was owned by the Republic of 
Cuba and flying the Cuban flag, while the Marble Islands was owned by a Leichstenstein 
corporation and flying the Somali flag, but was under a demise charter to Mambisa, a Cuban 
State enterprise. The I Congreso del Partido was a new vessel being built at a yard in 
Sunderland, England, for a Liberian company, but assigned the benefit of the contract to 
Mambisa, which took her delivery on behalf of the Republic of Cuba, as a trading vessel, 
intended for use for trading, when she was arrested. 
132. Consent is a key to a number of issues. Without consent of the territorial State, it 
32
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1987], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol14/iss2/4
1987] Terrorism and Jurisdiction 173 
Consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by another State is generally 
accorded in the form of bilateral agreements between like-minded 
nations or multilateral conventions within a region or sub-region of 
approximate legal and cultural background. Thus, a State may ex-
ercise jurisdiction, not because the accused is arrested in its terri-
tory, nor because the offense was committed by or against its na-
tional, but more precisely and resolutely because another State, 
having the custody of the accused, has agreed to deliver or surren-
der the alleged offender to be tried by the forum State. Had there 
been no rendition, there would be no ground for jurisdiction. 
V. A RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
A. RATIFICATION OF ANTITERRORISM-RELATED CONVENTIONS 
A response to acts of international terrorism should be ade-
quate and appropriate if international terrorism is to be discour-
aged. Each State has been urged to ratify the various conventions 
designed to prevent and suppress offenses that are related to inter-
national terrorism, such as the taking of hostages, 133 unlawful 
seizure of aircraft, 134 and offenses against internationally protected 
persons including diplomatic agents135 in compliance with Resolu-
tion 61(XL) of the General Assembly.136 Ratification also requires 
the adoption of legislation giving effect to the obligations under 
the relevant conventions.137 
Such actions by States could contribute in no small measure 
to international cooperation in the field of prevention and suppres-
sion of international terrorism. With the willingness on the part of 
might be considered unlawful intervention to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over the ter-
ritory of another State as in the Eichman case, to effect an arrest or in the Entebbe incident 
to rescue hostages and protect nationals. On the other hand, with the consent of the territo-
rial authority, Indonesian commando units successfully stormed the hijacked Garuda air-
craft at Don Muang Airport in 1984, with the assistance of Thai security force. 
133. Internationsl Convention ag~nst the Taking of Hostages, supra note 44. 
134. See, e.g., The Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, supra note 47; Tokyo Con-
vention, supra note 85; Montreal (Sabotage) Convention of 1971, supra note 85 (recom-
mended also by I.C.A.0.). 
135. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes, supra note 43. 
136. G.A. Res. 61(XL), Dec. 9, 1985, 25 l.L.M. 239. 
137. Several States have adopted legislation to give effect to treaty obligations in the 
absence of existing federal statute enabling the State to assume jurisdiction "by treaty." 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1984) (piracy); Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 
818, 821 (1983) (war crimes); Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (torts). "The 
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, 
and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense." See United States v. Hud-
son and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
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the overwhelming majority of States to combat international ter-
rorism, incidents of transnational terrorism should be curtailed. If 
hijackers were arrested wherever the hijacked aircraft landed, hi-
jacking could be deterred. This would require cooperation of States 
to ensure safety in international air transport and navigation, 138 
and not to yield to the demand of terrorists. 
B. IMPROVEMENT OF EXTRADITION PROCEDURES 
The problems relating to extradition deserve the most meticu-
lous attention. In the first place, extradition depends on the agree-
ment or consent of the requested State to turn over or surrender 
custody of an alleged offender or a condemned person to the au-
thority of the State requesting extradition. As a matter of princi-
ple, extradition is generally carried out at the discretion of the re-
quested State.139 The request for extradition itself is discretionary 
on the part of the executive branch of the government requesting 
extradition, taking into account the existence of legal provisions 
and the process of law to be fully observed. 140 There is thus an 
element of discretion on both sides, as far as the executives are 
concerned. 
Legal provisions, if any, and procedures to be followed would 
also have to be improved.141 If according to the law, the offense is 
not recognized as a crime in the requested State or the offense is 
political, 142 extradition will not take place. 
138. The mining of a harbor of a State disrupting international maritime trade has 
been held to violate international law as well as restricting freedom and safety of navigation. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 
(Judgement of June 26, 1986). 
139. The requested State, by virtue of its territorial sovereignty, is virtually free to 
surrender the alleged offender or else to grant asylum. The discretion of the territorial State 
is almost unqualified in spite of a binding treaty obligation aut dedere aut judicare, for the 
option aut judicare is necessarily conditional on several considerations, such as, legal proce-
dures, due process and political expediency. See supra note 75. For further discussion of the 
political offense exception, see infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
140. In the extradition statutes and practice of many States, procedural safeguards ex-
ist to ensure respect for human rights of the accused person, at times to the extent of al-
lowing the court of the requested State to investigate the danger of persecution or discrimi-
nation based on race, religion or political opinions to the detriment of the fugitive. See, e.g., 
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 792-803 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 271 (1986), and 
sources cited in support of the various standards surrounding the political offense exception. 
141. See, e.g., New Problems of the International Legal System of Extradition with 
Special Reference to Multilateral Treaties, ANNUARE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL No. 60-11, at 211-83 (1983) (session de Cambridge) [hereinafter Problems of 
Extradition]. 
142. For recent literature in regard to the practice of the United States, see, e.g., Gil-
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Extradition is therefore based on law or statutes of the States 
concerned and also on the availability of treaty provisions applica-
ble to the situation. The problems are multiplied in this connec-
tion by a lack of uniformity in the treaty practice of States and 
absence of common standards in national legislation in regard to 
extraditable offenses, non-extraditability of nationals and particu-
larly the treatment of political offenders. 
Notwithstanding the discretionary element of extradition as 
far as the administration or executive branch of the government is 
concerned, the judicial practice of States in defining an offense as 
political, or mixed or with political motivation has been neither 
helpful nor instructive. 143 The case law of various countries has not 
demonstrated any consistent pattern of legal developments. Con-
tradictory theories and opposing criteria are interpreted and ap-
plied without any regularity. Persons accused of offenses which 
could be classified as acts of international terrorism have some-
times been extradited and other times released on the ground that 
the offenses complained of were either political, 144 with political 
motivatiOn, m relatively or preponderantly political146 or indeed 
there was potential danger of the accused being persecuted for po-
litical offenses.147 Given the jurisprudence of the more advanced 
bert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 
695-723 (1985); Lubet & Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of 
Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193-210 (1980); Stephan, Constitutional 
Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777-800 (1980). 
143. See, e.g., Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts - Crimes or Political Infractions? An Ap-
praisal of Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265 (1979-
1980). Note especially the survey of State practice, the Anglo-American model; the Predomi-
nance Approach of the Swiss Courts; the French Test; and The Extradition of Transna-
tional Terrorists by French Courts. Id. at 271-97. 
144. See, e.g., In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG., mem. at 4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 
1979). The Federal Magistrate found that the bombing of the British Army Installation in 
England by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (P.l.R.A.) was directed at the British 
Army - a prime target for guerrilla warfare during an "insurrection and a disruptive uprising 
of a political nature" in Northern Ireland in 1974. Compare Justice Denman's test of politi-
cal offense exception: there must be a political disturbance at the time of the offense and 
the offense must constitute an overt act incidental to or part of the political disburbance. 
See In re Castolini [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. 
145. See, e.g., Vali, The Santa Maria Case, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 168-75 (Mar.-Apr. 1961) 
(discussion of the Santa Maria, a steamship, that was captured by Captain Galvao as a 
protest against the Portugese Government). 
146. See, e.g., Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958) (per curiam) In Karadzole, 
the extradition request was regarded by the Supreme Court as being for a relative political 
offense. 
147. See, e.g., Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, [1954] 1 Q.B. 540. The extradition 
request was denied on the ground that it would result in punishment for the treasonous act 
of defecting to a capitalist country and not for the common crimes of use of force. See id. 
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Western civilization, such as France, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Switzerland, Italy and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the practice cannot be said to be free of inconsistency in 
this regard, 148 especially when the offenses are closely associated 
with acts of international terrorism. 
The very definition of "international terrorism," as it is more 
generally accepted in international convention, 149 contains an in-
herently political element. Terrorism is an offense directed against 
another State for which a State is responsible either for undertak-
ing, assisting or tolerating its commission. Applying this definition 
to offenses classified as terrorist acts, such activities would invaria-
bly appear to be politically inspired. 
In actual practice, the decision of a State to extradite or not to 
extradite a terrorist is likely to be prompted by political or human-
itarian considerations. Among the closely associated States or in an 
economically integrated community, it is easier to extradite ter-
rorists for acts directed against a friendly government, an ally, or a 
member of the same regional community. 110 On the other hand, the 
State sympathizing with the cause of the insurgents for whatever 
motivation is not easily persuaded to extradite terrorist-insur-
gents,161 whether or not they are to be labeled freedom-fighters 
148. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note, at 63-114 (statement by Christopher L. Blakesley 
before the House of Representatives, Judicial Committee, Mar. 4, 1986). 
149. See supra notes 1-54 and accompanying text; see also M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TIONAL CONTROL OF TERRORISM: SOME POLICY PROPOSALS, in U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS 
& SOCIAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW or CRIMINAL POLICY at 44, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/ 
SER.M/37, U.N. Sales No. (1981). 
150. See, e.g., Klaus Croissant Extradition Case, decision of the Chambre d'accusation 
de Paris, 1979. In the Klaus Croissant case, where for reasons of European solidarity, extra-
dition was granted from France to Germany, compare the Piperno and Pace case, where 
extradition was ultimately allowed to Italy whose statesman and former Prime Minister 
Aldo Moro was assassinated by the Rosso Brigatto. 
151. Note the U.S. cases concerning extradition requested for members of the Irish Re-
publican Army (LR.A.) to Northern Ireland. See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 792-
803 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 271 (1986); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1981); 
In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed, 786 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 
1986); Jn re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), reprinted in 132 CONG. 
REc. §§ 9146-9147 (daily ed. July 16, 1986). 
These cases gave rise to considerable debate in the Senate preceding the amendment of 
the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom. Supplementary Extradi-
tion Treaty, United States-United Kingdom, June 8, 1972, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 89 (Feb. 1987) 
(entered into force on December 23, 1986). Compare the French case of Abu Daoud, alleg-
edly an organizer of the Munich Olympics Massacres of Israeli Athletes, who entered France 
under a false identity in early January, 1977 as part of an official PLO delegation. Germany 
as well as Israel requested extradition of Abu Daoud. France was placed in an exceedingly 
difficult situation, having taken strong public stand against transnational terrorism, and yet 
wishing to cultivate relations with Arab countries. Abu Daoud was released on technical 
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rather than terrorists. It is not inconceivable that a State, not 
wanting to prejudice its foreign relations, may avoid the obligation 
to extradite by simply deporting the alleged offender.m Deporta-
tion could be an alternative to extradition if extradition is indeed 
otherwise precluded by the political character of the offense which 
is clearly non-extraditable. m 
C. TERRORISM AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE POLITICAL OFFENSE 
EXEMPTION 
Recent trends in State practice appear to reflect political fla-
vor in the treatment of political offenders. Decisions to extradite or 
to release the alleged offender may depend on factors that are 
purely political, such as whether the fugitive is from a socialist 
country, 1H whether the requesting State is an ally or a trading 
partner,m or whether there is a support for his group in the asy-
lum State.116 It is true that due process of law dictates some partic-
ipation by the judiciary whose role could be conclusive in a nega-
tive way. If the offense was considered non-extraditable by the 
judicial authority, the executive could not very well override that 
ruling, although there was nothing to stop a disguised form of ex-
tradition through the deportation process.157 Therefore, the finding 
by the court that the offense is extraditable will not necessarily 
result in actual extradition, since the executive branch of the gov-
ernment could review the final process of rendition. 
The political offense exemption was first seen in the Anglo-
Belgian Treaty of 1834.158 It is a standard clause in extradition 
grounds and quickly deported to Algeria. London Times, Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 4; Le 
Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, at 14, col. 3. 
152. See, e.g., Note, The Provisional Arrest and Subsequent Release of Abu Daoud by 
French Authorities, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 495 (1977). Abu Daoud was quickly deported to 
Algeria. 
153. See, e.g., O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 Mon. L. REV. 521 
(1964). 
154. See, e.g., R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, (1955] 1 Q.B. 540; In re Kavic, Bjela-
novic and Arsenijevic, [1952] l.L.R. 373 (Case No. 80). Note Lord Goddard's statement in 
Kavic: "Those who do not wish to submit to the regime have no alternative but to escape it 
by flight abroad." Id. at 37 4. 
155. See, e.g., Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1973] A.C. 931, H.L. (E.), 
where the court held that a fugitive should not be returned to the State of dispute; Cheng 
was wanted for attempting to overthrow the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. 
156. See supra note 151 for examples of U.S. practice in regard to the Irish cases. 
157. See supra notes 151-52. In the Abu Daoud case, France preferred to avoid the 
dilemma by ordering sudden deportation of Abu Daoud to Algeria. 
158. 22 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 223. 
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treaties and legislation. As has been seen, however, the application 
of this exemption has been far from settled. 169 
States are nevertheless free to conclude agreements undertak-
ing to extradite even political offenders.160 There is no preemptory 
norm requiring non-extradition of political offenders. In actual 
practice, it would be extremely difficult to conceive of such a norm, 
since the concept of political offense exemption itself is not free of 
confusion, susceptible to differing interpretation, hence opposite 
results. 161 
The current trend has been to preclude certain offenses, which 
could be viewed as relatively political, from the political offense 
exemption. This has been achieved in a number of conventions, 
especially on the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, 162 
Seizure of Aircraft, 163 Taking of Hostages, 16" Lese Majeste, m the 
Attentat Clause166 and War Crimes.167 Acts of terrorism have been 
classified among offenses against the peace and security of man-
159. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXEMPTION TO EXTRADITION, 
THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC ORDER 204 (1980). 
160. See Agreement Relating to Common Law Criminals, An Exchange of Letters Be-
tween Cambodia and Thailand, Dec. 15, 1960, No. 5493, 382 U.N.T.S. 322-27 [hereinafter 
Exchange of Letters]. 
161. In 1960, Thailand and Khmer (Kampuchea or Cambodia) concluded four agree-
ments by exchange of letters with the good offices of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold 
of the United Nations. Exchange of Letters, supra note 160, Nos. 5490-5493, 382 U.N.T.S. 
342. Number 5492 relates to rebels and political refugees. The object was to oblige Thailand 
not only to refrain from supporting Khmer rebels and assisting Cambodian political refu-
gees within Thailand, but also to surrender political rebels who had been tried and con-
victed in absentia in Pnompenh. Soon after the conclusion of the exchange of letters, Cam-
bodia requested the extradition of a certain Khmer Serei named by Sihanouk Government 
as a common criminal. The fugitive sought by Cambodia died probably of fright upon learn-
ing of the conclusion of such an arrangement. Id. 
162. See generally the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
supra note 11; the Washington Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism, 
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International 
Significance (1971); and See the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 
Strasbourg, (Jan. 27, 1977) at 18-26, 101-104 and 104-108. 
163. Regarding the safety of aricraft as recommended by the l.C.A.0., see the Tokyo 
Convention, supra note 85; The Hague (Hijacking) Convention of 1970, supra note 47; The 
Montreal (Sabotage) Convention of 1971, supra note 85. 
164. The Hostages Convention 1979, at 117-120. 
165. Lese Majeste is an offense against the Head of State. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 812 
(5th ed. 1979). 
166. See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes, supra note 43. 
167. Surrender of War Criminals and Traitors, G.A. Res. 170(11) (October 31, 1947); 
Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punish-
ment of Persons guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074 
(XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973). 
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kind. Once the revised draft code is adopted, the extradition prob-
lem will be better clarified if not further simplified.188 
Bilateral treaty practice of States appears to have started a 
clear trend in support of extradition of terrorists whether or not 
there has been a taint of political flavor in their activities. A bal-
anced approach must nevertheless be maintained between the in-
terest of the international community to prevent, suppress and 
punish acts of terrorism, and the interest of the individual to enjoy 
asylum from political persecution and the right of self-determina-
tion of every people. Human rights should be respected and not be 
sacrificed at any price. Thus, the new series of U.S. extradition 
treaties, starting with the Supplementary Treaty with the United 
Kingdom, precludes in its first article from the political offense ex-
emption five categories of off enses.189 However, article 1 is subject 
to the reservation of article 3: "There would be no extradition if 
the request was made 'with a view to try or punish him (the al-
leged off ender) on account of his race, religion, nationality or polit-
ical opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his 
trial, or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by 
reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.' "170 
This innovation is not a complete answer to every problem 
connected with extradition. It remains to be seen in actual practice 
how the United States and the United Kingdom will apply the pro-
visions of article 1 subject to the safeguard contained in article 3. 
States still retain discretion and freedom of action through differ-
ing interpretation. 171 
168. See REPORT or THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 10, 99th Cong., 
39th Sess. (1986). 
169. S. EXEC. REP., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986). Supplementary Extradition Treaty 
with the United Kingdom, July 8, 1986. The following categories of offenses are excluded 
from the political offense exceptions: 
Id. 
(a) an offense for which both Parties have the obligation to extradite under a multi-
lateral convention; 
(b) murder, voluntary, manslaughter, and assault causing bodily harm; 
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; 
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel 
bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers any person; and 
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as an accom-
plice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offense. 
170. Id. at art. 3(a) of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United 
Kingdom. 
171. For recent developments in multilateral treaties, see Problems of Extradition, 
supra note 141, at 211-283. As stated by Rapporteur Karl Doehring: "New problems of the 
international legal system of extradition with special reference to multilateral treaties," pro-
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The language of the recent General Assembly Resolution 
61(XL) on measures to prevent international terrorism is more em-
phatic. Paragraph 8 runs as follows: 
The General Assembly 
8. also urges all States to cooperate with one another more closely, 
especially through the exchange of relevant information concerning 
the prevention and combatting of terrorism, the apprehension and 
prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators of such acts, the con-
clusion of special treaties and/or the incorporation into appropriate 
bilateral treaties of special clauses, in particular regarding the ex-
tradition or prosecution of terrorists.172 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The preceding study appears to suggest that the problem of 
establishing jurisdiction over terrorist activities is but part and 
parcel of the bigger problem of com batting international terrorism. 
It is nevertheless a key to unlocking other problems. As always, 
international cooperation provides a hopeful means in our search 
for a meaningful response to terrorism and the problem of 
jurisdiction. 
One practical measure of international cooperation is to adopt 
legislation creating jurisdiction to adjudicate by making terrorist 
acts, as defined in the Introduction, justiciable and punishable, 
thereby avoiding a vacuum in the substantive law, recognizing the 
criminality and punishability of acts of international terrorism, 
and bridging whatever gap or loophole that may exist in the juris-
diction of the forum State. 
All the legitimate bases of jurisdiction may be adopted, in-
cluding the passive personality principle which need ,not be com-
pletely dissociated from the protective principle. A State has the 
right and also, in some instances, the duty to protect its own na-
tionals abroad. One means of securing protection is to make it a 
punishable offense for anyone to commit an act against a national 
of the State calculated to create fear or terror within the State. An 
act of international terrorism against an American citizen because 
of the nationality may be deemed to be directed against the secur-
posing definition of political offense in a negative sense. Id. 
172. See G.A. Res. 61 (XL), supra note 136. The resolution also endorses l.C.A.0. and 
International Maritime Organization (l.M.0.) recommendations for ratification of conven-
tions dealing with terrorism aboard aircraft or against ships. Id. 
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ity interest or stability of the United States. Once jurisdiction is 
created for an offense against a national abroad whatever the true 
basis, the forum State may assume and exercise jurisdiction, not 
only to prosecute the alleged offender if and when found within 
the territory, but also to secure his custody through the process of 
extradition. 
A more effective control of international terrorism may be 
achieved through closer cooperation among States by ratifying in-
ternational agreements dealing with terrorism, thereby applying a 
common definition and standard for identification of acts of inter-
national terrorism, and facilitating exchange of relevant informa-
tion concerning the prevention, suppression and punishment of 
acts of terrorism as well as the arrest, prosecution or extradition of 
the authors of such acts which should not be deemed to be political 
offenses so as not to preclude the possibility of extradition.173 
The current problem is also closely linked to the possibility of 
apportionment of criminal jurisdiction in the event of a jurisdic-
tional conflict. Priorities may be set through bilateral or multilat-
eral treaties, while the possibility of extradition provides room for 
further flexibility of adjustment. Further developments of State 
practice in this direction are about to assume a new dimension as 
States, as members of the world organization, are moving closer in 
their collective efforts to combat international terrorism. The 
problem of jurisdiction patiently awaits its turn for a more orderly 
settlement. 
International law cannot afford to allow terrorism to go un-
checked. Legal developments by way of codification must keep 
pace with transnational terrorism which continues to increasingly 
threaten the peace and security of mankind. 
173. See the Fifth Report by Minister Doudou Thiam on the Draft Code of Offences 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Mar. 17, 1987. The new text of Art. 4 (1) of the 
Draft Code provides that "every State has the duty to try or prosecute (aut dedere aut 
punire), any perpetrator of an offence against the peace and security of mankind arrested in 
its territory." Id. at 7-8. It was noted that decisions rendered at municipal levels were con-
tradictory, and even a supreme jurisdiction to harmonize judicial decisions could itself adopt 
decisions that would have to vary with the progress of time. Difficulty to secure extradition 
is inherent in all cases where offenses are politically motivated. In reality, States might pre-
fer to try the offenders and give them light sentences or acquit them altogether. Id 
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